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Natural Religion and World Society 
Reflections on Morality, Belief, and Experience 
Abstract 
David Hume's reputation as a 'moral atheist' (Gaskin 1988/ 1998) was based on his distinction 
between the spheres of everyday morality from the institutionalized dogmas of religion. In 
discussing morality in the rise of World Society, this paper compares the contrasting 
approaches of Hume and Durkheim to morality and religion, the ‘science of man’ against the 
science of the ‘sacred’ respectively, in order to question the Durkheimian moral concept of 
the ‘Church’ as a moralist step too far from Hume's emancipating concept of ‘natural 
religion’. Furthermore, the paper asks if the concept of the ‘sacred’, which is embedded 
throughout the history of the ‘anthropology of religion’ in various ways and contexts (see 
Ruel 1982, Tambiah 1990, Asad 1993), constitutes a Christian fundamentalist way of 
thinking, ideologically manifested as a kind of naturalized enthusiasm. By liberating 
Durkheim's approach to the sacred from its moral implications, when associated with the 
evolution of the morality of purity and pollution (Douglas 1966), the paper expands on the 
question of morality, on the one hand, looking at moral sense as an intuition, and on the 
other, as an institutionalized habitus. In doing so, the paper compares anthropological and 
psychological approaches to Belief, Design, and Experience, in relation to the sacred. In this 
context, the paper further wonders if the Human is naturally a fundamentalist animal, 
motivated by sacred delusions, passions, and self-centrism, as manifested in the Dialogues 
through the characters of Philo, Demea, and Cleanthes, whose personal emotions challenge 
the Christian ideal of transgression and unity expressed in numinous sacred experiences. At 
the same time though, the author examines if this secularized approach to the sacred is 
limited in terms of the emotional and subliminal feelings of religious practices. This has 
implications regarding methodological issues of interpretation in anthropology and 
ethnography, the gap between theory and practice respectively. In conclusion, the paper 
returns to Hume’s emancipating concept of ‘natural religion’ as a kind of pagan, 
emancipated, universal, and amoral appreciation of the objective natural world (which 
includes the subjective human mind), finally wondering if at this moment of History, the birth 
of a new world religion would instinctively connect humanity in a Kantian process of the 
formation of a World Society. 
The Free Spirit of David Hume (May 7, 1711 – August 25, 1776) 
 
In 1745, David Hume applied for the chair of Ethics and Pneumatical Philosophy at the 
University of Edinburgh, but was promptly rejected by the University’s principal, who 
accused him of ‘atheism, heresy, and scepticism’ (Pike 1970: xi). The accusations echoed 
Hume’s characterization as a ‘moral atheist’, referring to both his writings and his way of life 
(Gaskin 1988, 1998: xxi-xxii, also cited in O’Connor 2001: 14, 16). Growing up in the strict 
Presbyterian environment of 18
th
 century Scotland and educated in the popular Calvinist 
Creed, the adolescent Hume came to have ‘an accurate philosophical turn’
1
 away from the 
Christian Church, towards polytheism, druidism, and paganism (Smith 1947: 9-13, Pike 
1970: 10-11, Siebert 1990: 69-72, O’Connor 2001: 2-3, among others)
2
. This turn towards 
‘natural religion’ inevitably comes to mind in a short walk from the city to the outskirts of 
Edinburgh, the birthplace of the philosopher. The ancient city of Edinburgh is a very dark 
place, marked by imposing black cathedrals and gothic towers. As the visitor walks through 
the dark alleys towards the green hills at the western borders of the city, he/she cannot but 
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feel amazed by the beauty and perfection of the landscape, with its wild life still intact, the 
beauty of the green hills and the ancient red rocks sprawling out of the fields. From the top of 
the hill, the Castle and the Cathedral directly belong to this natural order, as if the buildings 
spring out of the ancient red rock. It is not an unsubstantiated assumption therefore to 
imagine Hume’s ideas of religion, which he often associated with fear and anxiety, to be 
aesthetically motivated by the architecture of the city he grew up, the same city that rejected 
him. The gothic city also says something about the fear of God and the power of the Church 
in Presbyterian Scotland. When the pressure was building up, maybe the young Hume took 
this walk, away from the religious centre to the green hills, and out of the darkness of the 
black Cathedral, to the playful light of the sun and the clouds; the Scottish Enlightenment. 
 
In one of his anonymous essays, entitled ‘On Superstition and Enthusiasm’ (1741/ in 
Haakonsen 1994: 46-50), Hume was critical of the institutions of ‘false religion’ and their 
‘enthusiasts’ (a characterization he adopted from John Locke
3
). On the one hand, he 
associated superstition with the fear and anxiety of nature which can lead to the 
unquestionable submission to the authority of priesthood. On the other, he further associated 
the feeling of enthusiasm with uncontrolled emotional positivism, which can lead to 
fanaticism and religious violence. In this context, Hume saw no relation of reason and 
morality to religion, as in his view, popular religions were based on ‘vulgar votaries, a 
species of daemonism’, encouraging ‘vulgar’ and ‘popular superstitions’ (EHU 1/11, and 
DNR: 121). Furthermore, he was convinced that monotheist religions were in essence 
totalitarian institutions that promised an after-life, among other doctrines, ‘play some 
whimsies of monkies in human shape’ (also in Smith 1947: 9-24, Siebert 1990: 95-104, 
among others). By contrast, for Hume the pagan religions of ancient Greece and Rome were 
closer to earthly materialism and everyday life, tolerance and sociability, while leaving ‘no 
such deep impression on the affections and understanding’
4
. In the rebellious spirit of the 
Enlightenment, Hume (re)turned towards a ‘natural religion’, referring to a Newtonian 
approach to the Divine, based on the critical examination of a posteriori observations, 
rationalizations, and experimentalism, in his search for God in Nature. 
For the emancipated Hume, the way to overcome superstition in religion was by investigating 
it through the lenses of philosophy and the concept of ‘natural religion’. This effort to return 
to nature echoed the spirit of the Scottish and European Enlightenment as an escape from the 
fears and illusions imposed by the Church. In this context, Hume’s early Treatise of Human 
Nature (1739-40), as well as, his Essays, Moral and Political (1741-2) and An Inquiry 
concerning Human Understanding (1748), launched a philosophical project that aimed to 
formulate: ‘an attempt to introduce the experimental method into moral subjects’. His method 
has been compared to a fork, called ‘Hume’s Fork’, and referring to the fork as a material 
body of a priori natural logic of numbers, science, and reasoning, and the food on top of it 
referring to a posteriori empirical and experimental understandings of the natural world (as in 
O’ Connor 2001: 20-21). For Hume, the dogmas of the religious institutions of his time were 
only a priori assumptions and dogmas imposed by the Church that had nothing to do with 
reasoning, logic, emotions, and everyday morality. Therefore, Hume’s moral philosophy was 
to study the human nature outside these a priori false assumptions, paving the way to the 
‘science of man’, which anticipated the birth of the Humanities in the following century. 
Dialogues concerning Natural Religion 
 
Hume’s investigation of the nature of Belief was enacted in his enigmatic play entitled 
Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion; a philosophical inquiry in belief and style, order and 
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disorder, the existence of evil and reason-ing, written in the form of a Socratic dialogue. But 
while Plato’s Socratic dialogues are underlined by a strong moral sense and a crystal-clear 
direction towards specific self-reflective conclusions, Hume’s Dialogues are inconclusive and 
enigmatic -as much as the man himself. The fictional play consists of three main characters 
(and a narrator) who represent three contemporary approaches to the Divine at the time the 
Dialogues were written (published in 1779)
5
: the faithful Demea represents the a priori 
fideism of ‘rigid, inflexible Orthodoxy’ (DNR: 30); the design theorist Cleanthes represents 
an opposing type of theism to that of Demea, based on a posteriori inductive 
‘experimentalism’
6
; and in between the two characters/positions stands the Socratic 
protagonist of the dialogues, the ‘mitigated’ sceptic Philo, who, according to most 
commentators, represents the views of the author (Pike 1970: xvi; O’Connor 2001: 12, 26-28, 
42-44)
7
. Hume’s God is indifferent, unapproachable, and inaccessible, an invisible existence 
that can be found everywhere and nowhere, unreachable beyond the limits of our physical 
senses, and the imaginations and logic of the human mind. Shades of Philo express this view, 
which ironically echoes the views of the faithful Demea. In other words that there is no point 
in discussing the existence of God, for there is no reasoning in faith, neither there is any 
rationality or logic that can reach God. This conviction echoes Cleanthes’ accusation towards 
Philo of Pyrrhonistic scepticism, but significantly, none of the three characters questions the 
existence of God in itself. In this sense, Hume does not question God, but rather focuses on 
the human mind, examining on the one hand, the feeling of Belief as expressed by Demea, 
and on the other, the limits of the Design theory as patented by Cleanthes. 
 
The play between the three characters reflects upon the 18
th
 century religious hypothesis of 
the Design Theory, as first expressed by Cleanthes, which is then critically challenged by 
Philo, in sort that the world is ‘nothing but one great machine’ in which the causal and 
functional order found in nature ‘resembles’ the order found among humans, and by analogy: 
‘the Author [God] of nature is somewhat similar to the mind of man’ (DNR: 45). Philo 
challenges this anthropomorphic, inductive, teleological, and intellectualist approach to the 
Divine on two levels. First, by undermining the analogy in itself as he challenges Cleanthes’ 
assumption that the universe is similar to a house and that the universe was created by some 
sort of a human mind, arguing that this view does not hold empirical grounds
8
; second, as the 
conversation turns towards the instinct of belief and the instinctual feeling of design -as stated 
by Cleanthes-, Philo, and through him Hume, concedes that: ‘A purpose, an intention, a 
design strikes everywhere the most careless, the most stupid thinker; and no man can be so 
hardened in absurd systems, as at all times to reject it’ (DNR: 116). Philo then continues by 
highlighting the ‘universal approbation’ of the ‘belief of invisible, intelligent power’, which 
however, he is very careful to distance from the institutions of Religion (i.e. ‘the first 
religious principles’). In other words, while Philo agrees with Cleanthes that Belief is a 
universal human and natural instinct, Religion is instead a ‘preconception’ that ‘springs not 
from an original instinct or primary impression of nature […] since every instinct of this kind 
has been found absolutely universal in all nations and ages […] The first religious principles 
must be secondary’ (NHR: 134, also cited in O’Connor 2001: 92)
 9
. 
In this context, Hume through his character Philo distances himself from the Christian 
Church, turning towards a more universal and naturalistic appropriation of the instinct of 
Belief. If the question over the existence of God is unanswerable, and the realm of God 
unreachable, then Hume’s scholarship is in itself bounded within the limits of nature and 
reason. This forms a Humean paradox, in a sense that the philosopher talks about ‘religion’, 
as if it is not the ‘true (natural) religion’ he anticipates. ‘God’ here is defined as a natural and 
emotional manifestation of the Human Mind, rather than of God, because there is no point in 
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discussing the existence of God, whose realm exists in a different dimension from the 
material world. This point of view is ironically raised by both the faithful Demea and the 
sceptic Philo, despite their extremely contrasting attitudes towards religion. If the question 
over the existence of God is unanswerable and unreachable, Hume’s scholarship is in itself 
bounded within the limits of reason and materialism. The religious hypothesis thus becomes a 
question of human nature and human praxis (rather than a question regarding the existence of 
God). In this sense, Hume’s discussion of Belief transcends the limits of the category of 
‘religion’, expanding towards a study of the Human Mind, which anticipated by a century the 
social anthropology, sociology, and psychology associated with the category of ‘religion’. 
More specifically, Hume’s anthropological legacy is largely based on two contrasting, and 
yet, complementary works, which were written at the same time he was putting together the 
Dialogues: on the one hand, The History of England (1754) which historically examined the 
role of the Christian establishment in the formation of English identity, using an 
interdisciplinary approach that combined the study of the history of English institutions 
through an anthropological perspective; and on the other, the philosophical enquiry into the 
Natural History of Religion (1757), in which he developed his philosophical project towards 
the emancipation from the English institutions and the strict Calvinist environment of his 
childhood. Hume’s anthropological legacy thus anticipated a number of branches of the tree 
of Humanities, from the 19
th
 century Intellectualist evolutionary study of animism to the 
functionalist psychological approaches to religion and the fear of nature (Tylor, Frazer, 
Malinowski), the Jungian study of archetypes and instinctual behaviour to the Durkheimian 
study of the relationship of the self to society, and deep into the 20
th
 century social and 
psychological functionalisms (Evans-Pritchard, Needham, Southwold) and symbolism 
(Douglas) to structuralism (Levi-Strauss) and post-structuralism (Bourdieu), and the study of 
everyday behaviour as a habitus (Mauss, Goffman, Geertz, Foucault, among others). It would 
be thus impossible due to the limits of this paper to reflect upon the entire legacy of Hume in 
relation to the study of the human mind and society. Yet, I wish here to reflect upon current 
trends in the anthropology of religion, in relation to the sacred feeling found in Durkheim’s 
moral concept of religo (‘to unite’), on the basis of the two themes that spring out of the 
Dialogues: the condition of Belief and the nature of Design. 
The Sacred 
The contrasting approaches of Hume and Durkheim to religion reflect upon their contrasting 
understandings of the self in the world. This can be comparatively illustrated in relation to 
their respective writings on the act of suicide. Hume’s rebellious essay ‘On Suicide’ 
(published under the title Of Suicide and the Immortality of the Soul in 1783, seven years 
after the author’s death) is a testament of his belief in the absolute freedom of the individual 
against the dogmas and fear of eternal damnation imposed by the Church: ‘I believe that no 
man ever threw away life while it was worth keeping’ (2005: 10). Hume contextualizes this 
statement in the reciprocal relationship between Society and the Individual as a social 
contract, however, rhetorically expanding on the individual right to withdraw oneself from 
society if someone  thinks that has no power left in him/her to ‘promote the interest of the 
public’: ‘All our obligations to do good to society seem to imply something reciprocal. I 
receive the benefits of society, and therefore ought to promote its interests; but when I 
withdraw myself altogether from society can I be bound any longer?’ In fact, for Hume this 
‘resignation of life’ is a ‘laudable’ duty to society (Ibid: 9). 
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By contrast, Durkheim in his Suicide (published in 1897) morally associated the act of taking 
your own life with the lack of social solidarity in industrialized societies. Furthermore, he 
controversially argued that because the Catholic establishment gives more emphasis on 
family as a way of life, the rates of suicide are lower than in Protestant countries where there 
is an emphasis on individual freedom. Seen in its totality, suicide is as much a psychological 
as a sociological reaction to the anomic and impersonal modern societies (also in Turner 
2011: 31). This approach to suicide should be seen in the greater context of Durkheim’s 
definition of ‘society’ as an ideal moral community, underpinned by a Judeo-Christian 
morality which ‘embraced an altruistic (Kantian) model of the individual’ (Turner 2011: 48). 
As the prominent Durkheimian analyst Talcott Parsons exclaimed, Durkheim’s idea of 
‘society’ was a strong moral rejection of Herbert Spencer’s utilitarian theory. As Parsons has 
highlighted both concepts of the ‘individual’ and the ‘social’ are theoretical abstractions, they 
do not correspond to a social reality. In this context, by ‘social reality’ Durkheim referred to 
collective representations of a collective conscious that exists outside the Individual, an a 
priori ‘psychic’ force that found expression through the ‘collective conscience’ of a group 
(Parsons 1968/ 1937: 355-359). Parsons’s influential analysis gave to Durkheim’s concept of 
‘society’ the moral depth of communal life, in which solidarity is a moral obligation, a 
personal matter of social order, morally opposed to self-interest and indifference found in 
anomic societies. For Durkheim, this ideal of a moral community was a universal one. He 
argued: ‘Egoism has been universally classified among the amoral traits […] if there is such a 
thing as morality, it must link man to goals that go beyond the circle of individual interests’ 
(1973: 65). 
In The Division of Labour in Society [1893] Durkheim described social solidarity as a 
collective feeling, ‘the foundation of the moral order’ (Durkheim, 1973: 139). He saw 
Modernity as a process of transition from ‘mechanical’ and agricultural systems to ‘organic’ 
forms of solidarity in industrialized large-scale societies. This transition raised moral 
questions in relation to the rise of individualism and self-interest as the norm. Accordingly, in 
Suicide, he controversially argued that: ‘The causes of death are outside rather than within us, 
and are effective only if we venture into the sphere of activity’ (1951: 43). In the face of an 
impersonal ‘society’, which pre-exists a priori and independently from each individual,  
Durkheim approached the act of committing suicide as a ‘social fact’: ‘[...] a fact sui generic, 
with its own unity, individuality and consequently its own nature –a nature, furthermore, 
more dominant social.’ (Ibid: 46). In this context: ‘Social facts are to be treated comme des 
choses in this sense, they are exterior to the actor in the sense of belonging to the “external 
world” and they “constrain” him in the sense of being outside his personal control, 
constituting thus a set of conditions to which his action must be adapted’ (Parsons 1968/1937: 
365). 
In this moral context, Durkheim went even further to define ‘religion’ from the Latin term 
religare, meaning ‘to unite/ to bind’, as the external to each individual moral and collective 
force that binds people together into a community, the ‘Church’, through shared beliefs and 
experiences: ‘A religion is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, 
that is to say, things set apart and forbidden –beliefs and practices which unite into one single 
moral community called a Church, all those who adhere them’ (1995: 44). The Elementary 
Forms do not try to approve or disprove the existence of God; rather, Durkheim’s final book 
discusses God as a figurative expression of Society, and how this figure is used both in moral 
life and in terms of rites and rituals. In this manner, Durkheim tried to understand the 
‘transcendental logic’ of religious representations, in order to investigate the a priori origins 
of ‘society’ (Morris 1987: 119, and also see Parsons 1968/1937: 301, Lukes 1977: 471, and 
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Aldridge 2007:33 and 67, among others). This elementary definition of ‘religion’ broke away 
from the evolutionist traditions of the previous century, largely based on Hume’s concept of 
‘natural religion’, which were developed by Edward Tylor and Sir James Frazer, who 
associated primitive animism with the practice of magic in paradigmatic opposition to science 
(Morris 1987: 98-106, and Tambiah 1990: 50-51). For Durkheim: ‘Science is said to deny 
religion in principle. But religion exists; it is a system of given facts; in short, it is reality. 
How could science deny a reality?’ (1995: 432). Furthermore, Durkheim argued that the 
category of science, similarly to the categories of religion and magic depend on public 
opinion: ‘[…] everything in social life rests on opinion, including science itself. To be sure 
we can make opinion an object of study and create a science of it; that is what sociology 
principally consists in’ (1995: 439). In this context, he held the controversial idea that: ‘the 
fundamental categories of thought, and consequently of science, are of religious origin’ 
(1973: 191, 1995: 367). 
Durkheim illustrated his ideas in his study of the Totem as an emblem of Australian tribal 
societies carrying a ‘moral force’: ‘[…] like the clan of which it is a symbol, can be realized 
only in and through them […] active within them’ (Durkheim, 1979:34). Yet, as Van Gennep 
wrote in 1913 in his critical review of the book, and Lukes (1973) and Giddens (1978) among 
others also exclaimed, Durkheim’s use of material coming exclusively from Australia 
represented allegedly as the universal elements of religious thought was: ‘not even typical of 
Australian Totemism, let alone totemic systems in other parts of the world’ (Giddens 1978: 
101). This methodological ambiguity is rooted in Durkheim’s definition of Totemism as: ‘the 
most primitive and simplest religion which it is possible to find’ (Durkheim cited in Lukes 
1973: 457). These contradictions in the Durkheimian methodology were further raised on the 
basis of the absence of prayer and a Christian concept of Belief in tribal Australia. Levi-
Strauss, in his critical reproach to Totemism (1962), argued that Totemism is not a 
homogeneous ‘religion’; neither the totem is simply an emblem of ‘society’; It is ‘not an 
organic synthesis, an object in social nature’ (1962: 5); rather, Totemism refers to a particular 
way of heterogeneous ways of thinking, which are functionally and organically built on the 
basis of a combination of four categories of understanding the natural world: nature, culture, 
group, and persons (Ibid: 16-17): ‘By its origin and its manifestations it belongs to biology 
and psychology, not to anthropology. The question is no longer to know why Totemism 
exists where it exists […] (but) to understand why it does not exist everywhere’ (Ibid: 58). 
Thus, Levi-Strauss returned to Hume’s animistic ideas of ‘natural religion’ in his quest for 
the universal mind, by developing structuralism as a methodology to understand the cognitive 
structures that underline human behaviour and history. 
 
The Design of Belief 
 
In his early Treatise of Human Nature [1938] Hume poetically developed the idea of ‘moral 
subjects’. Smith notes that for Hume: 
 
‘Moral distinctions, in any experience we have them, are, he maintains, of purely 
human significance. Like aesthetic satisfactions they are inseparably bound up with 
the animal and other special conditions of our creaturely existence; in forced 
abstractions from these, they have neither meaning nor validity […] Our aesthetic and 
moral sentiment thus stand, Hume holds, on a level with the so-called secondary 
qualities of matter; like the they are conditioned by the “complication of 
circumstances” [cited from the Treatise III, Part I, p. 469], partly bodily and partly 
mental, which determines our mode of existence as animal. This is an analogy […] 
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our moral experiences yield no data upon which a theology can be reared, and that 
they are indeed less, and not more, worthy of being used as a basis of analogy, than 
our intellectual capacities […“the moral qualities of man are more defective in their 
kind than his natural abilities”, Dialogues, p.219] (Smith 1947: 32-33). 
 
Hume demonstrated this in his essay entitled ‘Of Miracles’, which was initially kept in his 
desk due to the readers’ religious sensitivities (meaning their enthusiastic superstition), until 
it was included in An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (published in 1748, Section 
X). Hume saw miracles as violations of the natural order of the cosmos, and in the context of 
‘natural religion’, the belief in miracles is in itself false, for their credibility is based on their 
social acceptance by a group of people -rather than natural law-. If then miracles are social 
‘facts’ (as in Durkheimian sociology of ‘society’ and the ‘sacred’) then their value is 
deceitful, believed only by ‘ignorant and barbarous nations’ (X: ii, 94). The question then is if 
belief is a natural instinct in itself, and whether the instinct is psycho-social in its nature, or 
whether ‘society’ is itself a false delusion -like miracles-. 
 
Through his discussion of the disillusioned belief in miracles, Hume’s aim was to show how 
Belief is as much a psychological instinct as it has a social value, echoing Durkheim. For the 
latter, Belief was a ‘social fact’. In other words its validity depended on social acceptance: if 
something is accepted as ‘true’ that is because it is socially conditioned. Hume, however, 
distinguished between ‘false’ from ‘true’ beliefs, which echoed his greater separation of 
‘false’ religious institutions from ‘true religion’. He did so by making a clear-cut distinction 
between the spheres of everyday morality and reason from the sphere of religion. Throughout 
his writings on religion, Hume critically discarded the assumption that moral order depends 
on belief, in the same way  the feeling of obligation cannot be reduced to a mere ‘social fact’, 
but it is also a memory, a habitus. Echoing the separation of ‘true’ from ‘false’ religion, 
Hume further separated true from false belief, the first identified with the religious 
institutions and dogmatism, while the latter with the emancipating instinct of Belief, as the 
means to judge its true value by weighting empirical evidence for and against it. Accordingly, 
a false belief was associated with the Platonic deceiving world of poetry, ideas and fictions, a 
shadow of reality in Plato’s Cave; by contrast, the ‘true’ nature of belief is essentially 
instinctual, universal, natural, and social; in other words, earthly by nature. 
Therefore, while for Hume belief was an a posteriori psychological matter, for Durkheim it 
was an a priori ‘social fact’ and obligation a social contract. Subsequently, while Hume’s 
feeling of ‘sympathy’ is used to psychologically, as well as, aesthetically function as the 
essence of moral order, having nothing to do with ‘religion’ and/or ‘society’, or the ‘Church’. 
For Hume the function of the Church is no other than to, on the one hand, increase anxiety 
and the fear of God, while on the other, to eliminate the fear of disorder both in nature and in 
society, in order to restore the confidence and order of God. Emotions and feelings are thus 
central in comparing Hume to Durkheim’s understanding of faith. While for Hume the 
instinct of sympathy for example has nothing to do with religion, but it is an archetypal 
instinct, a Jungian part of human nature, in Durkheim the concept of the ‘sacred’ is dressed 
with an a priori Judeo-Christian moral sense of ‘good’ and ‘evil’. Thus, while Hume retains 
the earthly uses of morality as separated from religious superstition and fanaticism, and 
limited within the science of MAN –as also Philo demonstrates in the Dialogues-, 
Durkheim’s feeling is morally grounded to ideas and ideals of purity and pollution, as 
discussed by Robert Hertz (1960)
10
 and Mary Douglas (1966) among others. In this context, 
the moral and highly emotional concept of the ‘sacred’ carries a sense of blindness, 
manifested either as superstition and submission to the naturalized, institutionalized, and 
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established order, which when it becomes a matter of personal identity inevitably leads to 
monotheistic fanaticism, echoing Hume’s paper ‘Of Superstition and Enthusiasm’. Douglas’ 
appropriation of Humean thought therefore raises the question if the ‘science of the sacred’ 
was a step too far from Nature in Hume’s ‘science of Man’. Douglas demonstrated that from 
a Humean perspective, human everyday practices, such as washing and eating, carry no 
religious value, but they are designed and repeated small rituals (or habitus), which because 
they are conceived as ‘natural’, ‘drag nature into the discussion of ‘culture’ (Douglas 1975). 
‘[…] belief is an act of the mind arising from custom […] 
 which renders realities more present to us than fictions’  
[David Hume, Treatise of Human Nature 114] 
 
‘Necessity is something that exists in the mind, not in objects’  
[Hume Dialogues concerning Natural Religion 48] 
Mary Douglas in her discussion of evidence and the methodological issue of the limits of 
translation in anthropology, contextualized her famous work on Purity and Pollution (1966) 
as a by-product of Humean thought. In reading Hume, Douglas highlights that ‘causality is no 
more than a “construction upon past experience” […] due to “force of habit”’ (Hume cited in 
Douglas 1975: 276)
11
. The highly ordered moral cosmos of Purity and Pollution exists in the 
Mind, it is not the natural universe. By analogy the natural order we see in nature is the same 
cognitive function imposed upon nature, which is essentially chaotic. In this context, she tried 
‘to show how the world of nature is dragged into the arguments about society’ (Ibid: 281) and 
the moral implications of the Durkheimian sociology of the Sacred. Her subsequent work on 
Natural Symbols (1970) moved further, echoing Cleanthes’ Design Theory, which 
functionally associated patterns found in nature to patterns of human activity. Accordingly, 
Douglas’ work on body symbolism and the cosmos targeted the ‘characteristics of the 
classification system itself […] the logical patterning deployed in social behaviour’ (Ibid: 
312, 314). In this way, Douglas illustrated the process of naturalizing both morality (in terms 
of purity and pollution, 1966) and perception (in terms of cosmology, 1970). Her aim was, in 
direct reference to Humean appreciation of the ‘true’ nature of religion as opposed to ‘false’ 
religion, to show how the perceived as a priori emotional realm of religion becomes a 
personal ‘experience of society’. Yet, as Waxman has highlighted: ‘Custom […] is 
insufficient, by itself, to generate belief in any causal relation’ (1994: 168)
12
. In addition to 
custom, the habitus carries stylistic impressions, including memory (highly subjective and 
irregular), uncontrolled instincts (Archetypes in Jungian psychoanalysis), and the power of 
the habitus in itself through style and repetition to convince of its ‘natural’ truth-ness -in 
other words to become a ‘social fact’ (Durkheim). 
In introducing his book on Belief, Language, and Experience, Rodney Needham (1972) cited 
the above quote to pave the way for his investigation of the ‘interior state’ of belief as 
externalized through religious practices (Needham further citing Evans-Pritchard’s work on 
Nuer religion, 1972: 14-15, 66). Needham placed his emphasis on the psychology and 
language of belief, redefined as ‘an artificial contrivance for the convenience and advantage 
of society’ (Ibid: 150). Interestingly, however, Needham seems to be entrapped in his own 
logic, as in the very beginning of his book he highlighted that Penang of Borneo, where he 
conducted his fieldwork, ‘had no formal creed’. This observation returns to the question of 
translation and interpretation of belief-statements, particularly when vague terms such as 
‘belief’ and ‘experience’ have a different meaning among different peoples, or do not even 
exist as categories of thought in the first place. In his ground-breaking article on ‘Christians 
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as Believers’, Malcolm Ruel (1982: 9-31) while reflecting upon his fieldwork in West Africa, 
questioned the historical and cultural associations invested in Needham’s term of ‘belief’ as 
compromised by the dominant Christian understanding of ‘belief’ as an experience (i.e. the 
“numinous”, Rudolf Otto: 1958: 5-11). When belief is contextualized within a particular 
morality, then it is first expressed as an obligation, a duty, a religious ‘commitment’, and 
second as an ‘interior state’. Ruel came to question this emphasis on esotericism and 
psychology (see Ruel’s criticism of Needham, 1982: 27-8) raising the question to what 
extend have Christian ideology and morality affected the so-called ‘science’ of Humanities, 
including the study of religion in various contexts. 
 
These methodological issues in the science of the sacred thus extend to wider issues of 
interpretation and representation in anthropology and its practice ethnography. They are 
mainly of two kinds: a-historicity and morality. In respect to the first, Tambiah (1990) and 
Asad (1973/1993) discussed the historical predicament and association of the anthropological 
discourse to colonialism and post-colonialism, particularly in his discussion of Christianity 
and modernity. The term ‘religion’ was further scrutinized because of its unchallenged 
moralist association with the collective, in a naturalized moral opposition to ‘evil’ acts of 
self-interest. Tambiah’s discussion indirectly refers to Durkheim’s illustration of the ‘sacred’ 
realm, defined as a ‘religion’ from the Latin verb ‘religo’ (meaning to ‘unite’), which 
underlines his entire sociology as one based on the morality of the collective against 
individual self-interest. This also implies the self-sacrifice of the individual for the common 
‘good’ (i.e. the symbolic figure of Christ), which contrasts to Durkheim definition of 
‘witchcraft’ in the moral terms of self-interest, i.e. a group of ‘women’ working against the 
common good expressed by the male dominated religious hierarchy of the Durkheimian 
‘Church’ (Durkheim 1912/1995). Furthermore, Tambiah argued that this moral separation of 
‘religious’ from ‘magical’ acts was historically a ‘Protestant legacy which was automatically 
taken over by later Victorian theorists like Tylor and Frazer, and given a universal 
significance as both historical and analytical categories useful in tracing the intellectual 
development of mankind from savagery to civilization’ (Tambiah 1990: 19). In this context, 
Tambiah noted that translation is inadequate in transferring the quality of information taken 
from the field, first because the meaning of beliefs and conceptions changes over time, and 
second because the same terms are understood and practiced in different ways from one place 
to another, according to the insider’s point of view
13
. In this complicated pretext ‘translation 
implies some measure of comparability, and comparability in turn implies some measure of 
commensurability. But this inference has brought us to the threshold of the thorny and 
contested issue of how we are to understand commensurability and comparison’ (Tambiah 
1990: 125). 
 
In sum, we could argue for a return to the emancipating concept of ‘natural religion’, 
liberated from its moral implications, which are directly associated with the evolution of the 
Judeo-Christian morality and ideology of Puritanism (as Mary Douglas demonstrated 1966, 
1970), for a return to the field of the ‘anthropology of religion’ as a daily practice(s) (in the 
spirit of Marcel Mauss), which includes religion along with other spheres of private and 
collective performances that constitute social life. At the same time, however, we should also 
ask if this secularized approach to the ‘sacred’ is limited in terms of the emotional and 
subliminal feelings religion brings to people. In this context, we cannot help but wonder if the 
Human is naturally a fundamentalist animal, motivated by sacred delusions, passions, and 
self-interest, as manifested in the Dialogues through the characters of Philo, Demea, and 
Cleanthes, emotions which challenge the Christian ideals of transgression and unity as 
expressed through numinous ‘sacred’ experiences. Below I wish to further investigate 
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transcendental experiences from the psychological perspective of C.G. Jung whose ideas are 
very close to both Hume and Durkheim, the former associated with ‘nature’, the latter with 
the collective consciousness. 
 
Experience: Jung and Durkheim 
For both Jung and Durkheim religion was a matter of personal experience, a way to connect 
the individual to the wider collective, through the luminous experiential concept of 
‘numinous’ (Rudolf Otto). Jung defined the Self as the source of this collective and 
impersonal force, which he associates with archaic elements of the ‘collective 
unconsciousness’. The Self is ‘a religious mythologem’ existing ‘completely outside the 
personal sphere’ (Jung 1968b: 30. In Jung, this a priori force is manifested in luminous 
personal experiences, in which the Ego’s conflict with the Archetypes reach the 
consciousness dialectically, stimulating the individual’s psyche. By contrast, Durkheim’s 
sociological method pointed to Society as a priori, the external force expressed in ‘collective 
representations’, revealing the ‘collective consciousness’ of the group as a whole
14
.The a 
priori conceptions of Self and Society reveal an affinity between Jung’s internal concept of 
‘collective unconsciousness’ and Durkheim’s external ‘collective consciousness’. But while 
Durkheim’s starting point is Society, morally acting upon each individual, Jung’s begins with 
the archaic Self that subconsciously functions from within through dreams and myths. These 
originate from a deeper archaic collective unconscious that manifests itself through inherited 
and pre-existing archetypes which are manifested in rituals and art as collective 
representations (Jung 1968a: 41-3, and 59-63). Jung borrowed the term from Levy-Bruhl
15
, 
referring to a deeper esoteric world of ‘moral, aesthetic, and religious values’ of ‘universally 
recognized ideals or feeling toned collective ideas’ (1968b: 29). Jung discussed five 
elementary archetypes with a ‘preconscious psychic disposition’ that can initiate the creative 
or destructive forces within us: the Self, its Shadow, the Soul, the Divine Couple, and the 
Child. These archetypes have three important characteristics: first they are a priori, meaning 
that they are a natural part of human nature, pre-existing in the psychic of each individual by 
birth; second, they are elemental in the creation of social life, a collective unconsciousness, 
expressed in cosmology, arts, and religion; and third, because archetypes are esoteric, they 
are also thought to be universal
16
. 
Jung’s psychoanalytical method is generally based on the resolution of the conflict between 
who we believe we are, and how we think we are perceived by others—our projection of a 
Self. He defined the Self as a unitary whole, a self-projection of a luminous God-image 
[Imago Dei] (1968b: 31 and 37).Its counterpart is the Shadow, the things we perceive to be 
foreign, outside our Self, but which in fact still spring out from inside ourselves, but we 
conveniently project onto others. Conversely, the Shadow has ‘an emotional nature, a kind of 
autonomy, and accordingly an obsessive or, better, possessive quality’ (1968b: 8-11). In 
Jung, religion thus played a vital role in expressing these eternal forces through cosmological 
symbolism. He illustrated these two contrasting perceptions of who we think we should be, 
and who we deny we are not, in the images of the Christ and the Antichrist, the former as the 
archetype of the Self, which is ‘as good as perfect … the perfect man who is crucified’, and 
Satan as the antithesis, His moral dark counterpart (1968b: 69). The symbolism of Jesus as an 
archetype of the Self stems from His ambiguous, legendary, marginal life, and unknown 
origin. His miraculous life was marked by persecution, self-sacrifice, resurrection, and 
ascension to Heaven. However, Jesus is only an aspect of the archaic Self of “Christ”, which 
is present in everybody a priori, meaning that it pre-exists the historical figure of Jesus, while 
finding expression through the symbolic life of Jesus. Jung was thus careful to distinguish 
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between the natural symbol of Christ, from the historical figure associated with the 
institutionalised dogma of the Church (1969: 88), in the same way David Hume distinguished 
between natural and institutionalized religion. 
In this context, Jung was also careful to underline that by the will of God, he does not mean 
the Christian God. “God,” as in the philosophy of Socrates, is a daimonion, which is: ‘a 
determining power which comes upon man from outside’ (1968b: 27). Following the Bible in 
which ‘Christ ‘cast off his shadow from himself’, Jung argued that ‘the Christian-symbol (of 
Christ) lacks wholeness in the modern psychological sense, since it does not include (“cast 
off”) the dark side of things but specifically excludes it in the form of a Luciferian opponent’, 
i.e. the Antichrist (1968b: 41-45)
17
. Within the phenomenology of the Imago Dei, Christ’s 
crucifixion symbolically becomes the ‘crucifixion of the ego’ (Ibid: 44), revealing the illusion 
of the Self (as in Buddhism). The moral struggle between what is thought to be Good and 
Evil goes beyond history, as it takes place inside the Self, through personal moments of 
transcendental interactions between the archetype that ‘denotes completeness but is far from 
being perfect’, and the illusionary image of the Self, who we think we should be. This conflict 
takes place inside the ego, which consists of somatic and psychic forces, united through 
psychosomatic experiences that under particular circumstances can be seen as psychosomatic 
neurosis (Ibid: 3). 
In Psychology and Religion (1938), Jung further argued that the natural quaternity symbol is 
universal, as he considered the number Four to be the natural cosmological number of our 
understanding of the world (four elements, four directions, four seasons, four Hindu castes, 
four Gospels, four colours). However, within the Christian dogmatic tradition, the number 
Four is reduced to the Holy Trinity, which excludes the Mother of God who ‘represents the 
earth’, underlying the institutionalised theological association of women with desire (1969: 
87). In a similar manner, the ‘dogmatic figure of Jesus’ excludes his dark earth side, the 
human one, becoming a moral ideal for imitation. In this context, God’s images change but 
not God. By separating the two, and by highlighting the exclusion of the Shadow from the 
image of Christ, Jung argued, ‘the reality of evil was denied by the Church Fathers” (1968b: 
49), making thus, the important distinction between Jesus the historical person from “Jesus” 
the symbolic archetype of the Christ within. Furthermore, Jesus as a natural archetypal 
character is one of the endless manifestations of the archetype of the Self, which in 
Christianity is defined in the moral terms of sacrifice, humility, sense of justice, and 
transcendental self-liberation from the material body. However, these are motives to be found 
in various mythological cosmologies, and in a diversity of practices of sacred systems, which 
are conceptualized in imitation of the symbolic and historic lives of charismatic figures (as in 
Weber), such as Buddha and Muhammad. In this dualistic way, Jung (as well as Mary 
Douglas and Levi-Strauss) distinguished between history and mythology, the outer and the 
inner worlds of human existence
18
 thus, returning to David Hume’s ideas of the nature of the 
Human Mind, stripped from the moral implications carried by Durkheim’s concept of the 
Sacred. 
Towards a Pagan World Society [and the limits of history] 
In conclusion, I wish to return to the criticisms made by Tambiah, Ruel, and Asad, over the 
anthropological categories of understanding, such as ‘religion’, ‘belief’, and the ‘sacred’ 
respectively, in relation to the methodological issues raised because of the gap between 
anthropological theory and ethnography. Back in 1973, Asad cited a number of 
anthropologists of the time who questioned the functionalist and structuralist methods of the 
12 
 
previous decades as being ‘mechanical and lifeless’ (Ardener cited in Asad 1973: 10). 
Furthermore, he criticized the concept of universalism arguing that this idea of a ‘common 
sense’ that is in itself problematic in respect to anthropology’s historically constructed 
modernist legacy (Asad 1973: 16-17). Namely, the European ideal of ‘modernity’, defined in 
terms of progress
19
 and ‘universalism’ in the form of so-called European ‘humanitarianism’, 
is often misconceived as being exclusively European (i.e. ‘the West and the Rest’ as in Hall 
278-9). This has serious implications for the study of religion and the discipline of 
anthropology: 
 
Anthropology is [...] inserted into modern history in two ways: first, through the 
growth of Europe’s political, economic, and scientific powers, which has provided 
anthropologists with their means of professional existence and their intellectual 
motive; and second, through the Enlightenment schematization of progressive time 
that has provided anthropology with its conceptual site: modernity’ (Asad 1993: 19) 
 
For Asad, the central cause of the intellectual crisis in anthropology in the 1970s to nowadays 
is evident by the absence of a coherent style, vocation, and irrelevance of the discipline to the 
changes in world history. This irrelevance was the result of the increasing specialization of 
anthropology into disconnected anthropological discourses, which, on the one hand, 
undermined the vocation of anthropology as a whole, and on the other, contributed to its 
professionalization, with anthropological associations multiplying in numbers and 
memberships, conferences, and publications, but lacking of a philosophical vision or 
understanding of the world. The methodological and intellectual crisis in the anthropology of 
religion and beyond, led towards a more specific historically investigation of ‘religion’. 
 
However, at this point I would further argue that the focus on the history of the discipline, 
although more than welcome, is rather limited in scope and understanding of the experience 
of the religious feeling, as discussed by Durkheim and Jung, either as a natural instinct or as 
an institutionalized belief. As I have tried to show in this essay, there is more to the sacred 
feeling that empowers those who are united under its symbolisms (against the unfaithful), so I 
further wonder if the collective conscious is an adequate concept in itself for understanding, 
for example, religious violence; and vice versa, if it is truly physically impossible to approach 
the sentiment of God as Hume claimed. On the other hand, for Hume this individual 
sentiment is spread everywhere and nowhere in the universe, as a poetic mimesis of the 
nature of the universe in itself. My argument here is that the recent turn towards historically 
specific types of fundamentalist Christianity, most of them rooted to the Americas, is limited 
both in scope and meaning. Unlike Durkheim, for Hume, religion is another branch of 
Philosophy echoing the Intellectualist movement in Anthropology in the 19th century. And in 
many ways, the discipline of anthropology is also another branch of the same Philosophical 
Tree. 
 
As a brief conclusion to this paper then, I wish to suggest for a return to Hume’s personal, 
and yet UNIVERSAL inquest of the HUMAN MIND, returning to the writings of Tylor on 
animism, but undressed from their ethnocentric 19
th
 century bias (i.e. cultural evolution from 
magic to religion to science). A Philosophy of a Natural Religion can be used as a critique of 
society and its naturalized order (see Mary Douglas), in the same way Hume criticized his 
own social environment and limitless authority of the Church. The emancipating aspect of 
‘natural religion’ might even be used in envisioning an anthropology of religion which will 
be again relevant to the changes in world history -as it was in Victorian times. In a re-
enchanted world connected through the internet, where religious exchanges, competitions, 
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and comparisons take place through our computer screens on a daily basis, a world that is still 
learning to live by itself, the challenge is to avoid the misconceptions of the past, and the 
historical association of the discipline to Christianity and colonialism, and instead, to work 
towards the formation of a unified world in the Kantian spirit of cosmopolitanism, which 
however retains its plurality, diversity, polytheism, towards a multilingual, and why not, 
‘pagan’ (from the Latin term referring to the farmer) world society. Getting rid of the fear of 
disorder and the apocalyptic anxiety of the end of civilization, in other words by killing our 
illusions, we could move on forward to a higher understanding of God, and even more 
importantly, for understanding each other. 





 I use this phrase from Hume’s Dialogues concerning Natural religion that Hume also uses to describe the 
design theorist Cleanthes (the narrator Pamphilus, DNR: 1). 
 
2
 Another view was that Hume’s enigmatic faith inclined towards the Buddhist doctrine of the soul (anatta) 
echoing Hume’s view that ‘religion’ was a type of philosophical practice and discourse, as in Morris, B. (1994) 
Anthropology of the Self: The Individual in Cultural Perspective London: Pluto Press, p.19. 
 
3
 David Hume’s work on ‘natural religion’ should be seen in conversation with John Locke’s distinction 
between ‘natural’ and ‘revealed religion’ which ‘was current in Locke’s day among those who wrote and spoke 
about religion.; no doubt the distinction should be seen as a descendant of the distinction between the preambles 
of faith and the articles of faith found in medieval philosophers such as Aquinas’ (Wolterstorff, N. 1994: 172, in 
The Cambridge Companion to Locke (ed.) Vere Chappell, 172-198)  
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 The Natural History of Religion [1757] Vol. ii, p.352, cited in Pike 1970: 13. 
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 The Dialogues were not completed until Hume’s death in 1776. The main Acts were written between 1751 and 
1761; Hume made a second revision in 1761, and completed his final enigmatic Act [XII] the year of his death 
in 1776.  A number of commentators have highlighted Hume’s eagerness to publish the Dialogues two years 
after his death, because of the restrictions of imposed on the philosophy of religion at the time by the 
Presbyterian establishment and popularized Calvinist Creed, which Hume inevitably came to question (Smith 
1947: 9-13, Pike 1970: xiv-xv, O’Connor 2001:4-5, among others). 
 
6
 The a priori and a posteriori understandings of the natural world constitute what has been called ‘Hume’s 
Fork’, the former referring to the a priori natural logic of numbers, the latter to the a posteriori domain of 
material empiricism (O’ Connor 2001: 20-21). 
 
7
 The term ‘mitigated’ scepticism originates from Hume’s Enquiry concerning Human Understanding (EHU: 
161, cited in O’Connor 2001: 44) and is used in opposition to Cleanthes’ accusation of Pyrrhonistic scepticism 
towards Philo, referring to the ancient nihilistic movement of the Pyrrhonians (DNR: 35). From the author’s 
perspective, the exploration of the tension between two contrasting deisms (Demea/Cleanthes) and two sceptical 
positions (Philo) offers the central motivation that underline the entire dialogue. 
 
8
 Philo rhetorically asks Cleanthes: ‘What peculiar privilege has this little agitation of the brain which we call 
thought, that we must thus make it a model of the whole universe?’ (DNR: 50). 
 
9
 ‘The belief of invisible intelligent power has been generally diffused over the human race, in all places and in 
all ages; but it has neither perhaps been so universal as to admit of no exception, nor has it been, in any degree 
uniform in the ideas, which it has suggested. Some nations have been discovered, who entertained no sentiments 
of Religion […] It would appear, therefore, that this preconception springs not from an original instinct or 
primary impression of nature […] since every instinct of this kind has been found absolutely universal in all 
nations and ages [… The first religious principles must be secondary’ (NHR: 134) 
 
10
 Hertz, R. (1960) Death and the right hand (eds.) Rodney and Claudia Needham, Routledge. 
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 Memory as a habitus and a technique of the self, anticipated Marcel Mauss, Goffman, Bourdieu and 
Foucault, among others, towards the sociological understanding of habitus in everyday life, as well as, in 
constructing moral personas [see Marcel Mauss essays 1934-9, particularly (1934) ‘Les Techniques du corps’ in 
Journal de Psychologie 32 (3-4). Reprinted in Mauss, Sociologie et anthropologie, 1936, Paris: PUF; Goffman 
The Presentation of the Self in Everyday Life (1959); and Bourdieu, P. (1980) The Logic of Practice, and (1984) 
Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste]. 
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 Full quote: ‘Custom […] is insufficient, by itself, to generate belief in any causal relation. This requires, in 
addition to the relations of constantly conjoined temporally distinct perceptions (henceforth, constant 
precedence), the presence of one customarily associated perceptions in the form of an impression in sensation, 
reflexion, or memory. There are thus three distinct facets of Hume’s account of the impression-original of the 
idea of cause: i) the experience (memory) of a constant precedence of perceptions; ii) a custom characterized by 
a feeling of facility in the transition of consciousness from one of the perceptions related by constant precedence 
to the other; and when one of these perceptions is present as an impression, iii) the power of custom to induce us 
not only to think of its associate but to believe that in represents something really existent’ Waxman, W. (1994) 
Hume’s Theory of Consciousness Cambridge UP, p. 168 
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 The distinction between insiders and outsiders is a matter of power: ‘To be “inside” is to have power; to be 
“outside” is to lack it (Bourdieu 1977/1989: 55). Accordingly, ‘objective’ structures in ethnographic analysis  
(referring to static categories of time, space, hierarchy, customs, habits, and so on) are ‘themselves products of 
historical practices... constantly reproduced and transformed by historical practices whose productive principle 
is itself the product of the structures which it consequently tends to reproduce’ (Bourdieu 1977: 83). In his 
critique of structuralism Bourdieu famously highlighted the danger of reproducing this ‘field of doxa of that 
which is taken for granted’, with the fruitless result to ‘only reinforce the structures by providing them a 
particular form of “rationalization”’ (Bourdieu 1977/1989: 17, 20, 166). 
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 Durkheim’s sociological method has been severely criticized for its a-historicity (Stanley J. Tambiah, Magic, 
Science, Religion, and the Scope of Rationality (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1990, 50-51), emphasis on a 
homogeneous and unifying concept of a ‘sacred” (Michael J. Sallnow, “Communitas Reconsidered” MAN Vol. 
16, 1981), and his a priori concept of ‘society” denies individual agency (Marilyn Strathern “1989: The Concept 
of Society is Theoretically Obsolete: The Presentations: For the Motion (I).” In Key Debates In Anthropology. 
Ed. Tim Ingold (London: Routledge, 1996, 60-66). Durkheim has been contrasted to Weber’s emphasis on 
individual action (“charisma”) as the means of making history: “Individualist thought (or methodological 
individualism) is often associated to Max Weber, whereas collectivist thought (or methodological collectivism) 
is associated with Marx and Durkheim” (Thomas H. Eriksen, Small Places, Large Issues. London: Pluto, 2001, 
84). 
15
 The term was first use by Levy-Bruhl in How Natives Think (1910). 
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 However, unlike Durkheim, Jung was adamant that History begins with the individual: “In our most private 
and most subjective lives we are not only the passive witnesses of our age, and its sufferers, but also its makers. 
We make our own epoch” (Jung 1934). In this context Jungian psychology is also connected to the making of 
history, as in Weber’s concept of “charisma,” referring to the individual “‘natural leaders’ in times of psychic, 
physical, economic, ethical, religious, political distress.”
 
Max Weber, Max Weber: On Charisma and Institution 
Building, ed. Shmuel N. Eisenstadt (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), 18. 
17
 In addition to the archetypes of the Self (Christ) and the Shadow (Antichrist) Jung referred to three more 
archetypes: the Soul (the male animus and female anima within Jesus), the syzygy (Divine Couple) as the ideal 
of complete wholeness and holiness, religiously expressed in the marriage of Christ to the Church, and the 
“Child,” the promise of transcendence symbolized by the birth of Christ.  
18
 In this context, Levi-Strauss highlighted a “gap” between history of the past and politics of the present: “in 
our own societies, history has replaced mythology and fulfils the same function ... to ensure ... the future will 
remain faithful to the present and to the past. For us, however, the future should be always different ... 
depending of course on our political preferences” in Myth and Meaning (London: Routledge, 1980), 43. 
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 Weber in ‘Science as a Vocation’ (1919) questioned the European concept of ‘modernity’, defined in terms of 
Protestant secularism, the division of space and labour, and the industry of war, as a ‘meaningless 
progressiveness’ (1968: 299) Max Weber: On Charisma and Institution Building, ed. Shmuel N. Eisenstadt 





David Hume http://davidhume.org/ 
Treatise of Human Nature [1739-40] 
Essays, Moral and Political [1741-2] 
An Inquiry concerning Human Understanding [1748] 
The History of England [1754] 
Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion [1757] 
 
Aldridge, A. (2007) Religion in the Contemporary World Cambridge: Polity 
 
Asad, T. (1973) (ed.) Anthropology and the Colonial Encounter NY: Humanity Books 
(1993) Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Powers in Christianity and Islam 
Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins UP 
 
Douglas, M. (1966) Purity and Pollution Harmondsworth : Penguin 
(1970) Natural Symbols Harmondsworth: Penguin  
(1975) Implicit Meanings London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 
 
Durkheim, E. 1912. Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse. Paris: Alcan (tr. 1995 The 
Elementary Forms of Religious Life. Trans. Karen E. Fields. New York: Free Press) 
 
(1951) Suicide New York: Free Press [first published in 1897] 
(1973) On Morality and Society (ed.) Bellah, R. University of Chicago 
(1984) The Division of Labour in Society New York: Free Press [first published in 1893] 
 
Gaskin, J.C.A. (1988) Hume’s Philosophy of Religion Humanities Press International  
(1998) (Ed.) David Hume: Principal Writings on Religion Including Dialogues Concerning 
Natural Religion and the Natural History of Religion Oxford UP  
 
Giddens (1978) Durkheim London: Fontana 
 
Haakonsen, K. (1994) (ed.) Hume: Political Essays Cambridge: Cambridge UP 
 
Jung, C.G. (1968a) Collected Works Volume 9 Part I The Archetypes and the Collective 
Unconscious London: Routledge and Kegan 
(1968b) Collected Works Volume 9 Part II AION London: Routledge and Kegan 
(1969) Collected Works Volume 11 Psychology and Religion: West and East London: 
Routledge and Kegan 
 
Levi-Strauss (1962) Totemism Harmondsworth 
 
Lukes, S. (1973) Emile Durkheim: His Life and Work A Historical and Critical study  
16 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
California: Stanford UP 
 
Morris, B. (1987) Anthropological studies of Religion: An Introductory Text  
Cambridge: Cambridge UP 
 
Needham, R. (1972) Belief, Language, and Experience Oxford: Basil Blackwell 
 
O’ Connor, D. (2001) Hume on Religion London and NY: Routledge 
 
Otto, Rudolf (1958) The Idea of the Holy London: Oxford UP [first published in 1923] 
 
Parsons, T. (1968/1937) The Structure of Social Action Free Press 
 
Pike, N. (1970) God and Timelessness Routledge and K.Paul 
 
Ruel, M. (1982) ‘Christians as Believers’ in Religious Organization and Religious 
Experience (ed.) J. Davis ASA Monograph 21, London and NY: Academic Press, p.p. 9-31. 
 
Siebert, D. (1990) The Moral Animus of David Hume Newark: University of Delaware Press  
 
Smith, N.K. (1947) (ed.) Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion Indianapolis: Bobbs-
Merrill 
 
Tambiah, S.J. (1990) Magic, Science, Religion, and the Scope of Rationality Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP 
 
Turner, B.S. (2011) Religion and Modern Society: Citizenship, Secularisation and the State  
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
 
Waxman, W. (1994) Hume’s Theory of Consciousness Cambridge: Cambridge UP 
 
 
 
